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LEGITIMATING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL PLURALIST 
APPROACHES 
Ruth Buchanan, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Osgoode Hall 
Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada 
Introduction 
This article will take up the conversation about legal pluralism in the context 
of debates over transnational governance, where legal pluralism has of late 
attracted considerable attention.1 Legal pluralism has its roots in legal 
sociology and anthropology, and particularly in the study of the co-existence 
of non-state, customary law or community norms with formal law.2  In the 
transnational context, this original focus is expanded to include the co-
existence, within a particular territory, of multiple normative regimes; local, 
national and international.  What is important to note, however, is that in this 
shift the conceptual orientation of the term remains the same: the effort to 
provide an empirically accurate description of multiple positive legal orders. 
That is, legal pluralism is conventionally utilized to identify a relevant 
attribute of the social fields in which law operates.3  So, most recent 
considerations of ‘global legal pluralism’ either invoke or illustrate the 
multiple, diverse and possibly even contested sources of law in transnational 
arenas, and argue for their growing sociological significance.  As I will 
elaborate below, while legal multiplicity is highlighted and even valorized in 
some of these accounts, their analytic reach is circumscribed by a positive 
conception of law itself.    
While it is difficult to disagree with the chorus claiming that transnational 
institutions must recognize pluralism as a relevant attribute of the global 
social fields that they seek to govern, it is also the case that this apparently 
modest descriptive claim embeds a number of assumptions about both law 
and the social that have for some time been subjected to considerable 
scrutiny within socio-legal scholarship.4  At the very least, it appears to posit 
______________________________________________________________ 
1   See generally Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking 
the Trade and Environment Conflict (2004); Teubner, “Global Bukowina: Legal 
Pluralism in World Society”, p.3, in Teubner, (ed), Global Law Without a State 
(1997); Wolfe, “See You in Geneva? Pluralism and Centralism in Legal 
Representations of the Trading System” (2005) 11 Eur.J.Int’l Rel. 339; Macklem, 
“Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism and the Paradox of Self-Determination”, 4 
I.J.C.L.488 (2006). 
2  Melissaris, “The More the Merrier? A New Take on Legal Pluralism” (2004) Soc. 
& L.S. 57 at 58. For influential summaries of the field, see also Griffiths, “What is 
Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 J. Legal Plur. 1 and Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ 
(1988) 22 L. & Soc. R. 869. 
3  Griffiths, supra n.2, at 2. 
4  As the relationship between ‘law’ and ‘society’ is the core concern of this field, the 
sources that could be cited are manifold.  Some ‘classic’ considerations might 
include Trubek and Esser, “‘Critical Empiricism’ in American Legal Studies: 
Paradox, Program, or Pandora's Box?” (1989) 14 L.&.Soc. Inquiry 3; as well as the 
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as self-evident a distinction between the legal and the social fields, each 
understood as autonomous, coherent and therefore available for objective 
description.  In some further accounts, which I will discuss in more detail, a 
normative claim is added to the empirical one, in which the ‘problem’ of 
legal multiplicity is resolved by reference to some higher regulative 
principle, such as a constitution.   
In this article, however, I seek to invest legal pluralism with quite a different 
analytic status.5  My approach has affinities with those who have identified 
legal pluralism as an aesthetic choice, an ethos, or a form of critical theory.6 
My point is neither to map a complex global legal environment nor to offer a 
theory of law per se.  Rather, and very much like several of the other papers 
in this symposium issue, I am attempting to open up a space in which to 
engage in a dialogue about different possible ways of imagining law.    
My own approach to the question of legal pluralism is historical, practical 
and critical.7  It takes as its starting point a critique of the tendency in 
contemporary debates on global governance to think of law as a privileged 
vehicle for carrying us towards some shared horizon of aspiration, that is, 
some more perfectly democratic or inclusive or responsive legal order to 
come.  That imagined future is rendered unattainable, I will argue, by the 
very conception of law in which it is conceived, a conception that also 
functions to limit our perceptions of legality in the present.  An alternative 
might be found in the re-traversal of the terrain of legal theory from the 
perspective of an ethos or ethic of pluralism.  Such an undertaking might 
invite a re-framing, at least provisionally, of such fundamental questions as 
the boundaries and form of law.  It becomes, if only for a moment, possible 
to imagine legal forms and institutions as both contingent and continually 
revisable.  Through such a re-framing, I seek to open up new avenues for re-
conceiving dominant forms of global governance and new opportunities for 
those whose interests are inadequately addressed by current institutions.8      
The article situates its practical critique specifically in relation to the World 
Trade Organization, and in particular, the range of responses to the widely 
articulated concern over that institution’s ‘crisis of legitimacy’. Concerns 
about legitimacy are frequently connected closely to the question of 
______________________________________________________________ 
essays collected in Sarat, Austin, Constable, Engel, Hans and Lawrence (eds.), 
Crossing Boundaries: Traditions and Transformations in Law and Society 
Research (1998).    
5  This formulation was prompted by Professor Davina Cooper’s probing 
commentary on an earlier version of this paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Law and Society Association, Las Vegas, Nevada, June 2005. 
6  See Manderson, “Beyond the Provincial: Space, Aesthetics, and Modernist Legal 
Theory” 20 (1995) MULR 1048; Davies, “The Ethos of Pluralism” (2005) 27 Syd 
LR 87; Kleinhans and MacDonald, “What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?” (1997) 12 
Can.J.L. & Soc’y 25   
7  My orientation draws heavily on Tully’s account of critical philosophy in “Political 
Philosophy as a Critical Activity” (2002) 30 Pol. Theory 533.    
8  As Tully, supra n.7, at 534, cogently describes it, the activity of critique “seeks to 
characterize the conditions of possibility of the problematic form of governance in 
a redescription (often in a new vocabulary) that transforms the self-understanding 
of those subject to and struggling within it, enabling them to see its contingent 
conditions and the possibilities of governing themselves differently”      
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pluralism.  In the WTO context, perceived deficits of democracy and 
accountability are seen to undermine its claim to legitimate authority.9  The 
domination of internal WTO agenda setting and negotiation processes by a 
few developed nations, and its relative impermeability to civil society 
organizations have been widely critiqued on the grounds that they reveal 
deep inadequacies of pluralism and democracy within the institution.10  
Although the debate over how to address these inadequacies has been rich 
and multifaceted, the range of approaches can be summarized in terms of two 
contrasting ideal-types.  The first is characterized by a formal, positive and 
singular conception of law, and might be described as the ‘constitutional’ 
approach.  Constitutional approaches in relation to the WTO tend to advocate 
an expansive and hierarchical approach to institutional reform that would 
aim to incorporate actors and interests who claim to have been previously 
excluded, as well as to consolidate the WTO’s legitimate authority over a 
broad swathe of contemporary transnational governance issues.  A ‘pluralist’ 
or ‘cosmopolitan’ approach, in contrast, would include an attentiveness to 
norm creation at the informal level and a much more modest conception of 
the appropriate policy scope of the institution. It would posit the WTO as one 
norm creating body among many in the international community, and 
encourage an interactional process of norm-creation among variously 
situated international actors.11       
This article will examine only one dimension of these broadly contrasting 
approaches, the legal-theoretical.  On the premise that one’s legal theory 
matters, that is, it has (material) consequences both for the design of 
institutions and for the conduct of actors within them, I seek both to 
investigate the concepts of law that are embedded within these debates, and 
to consider their effects.  Further, the debate over the constitutionalization of 
the WTO is not considered in isolation, but as one animated by and 
illustrative of a more general concern: how to legitimate the exercise of 
public authority beyond the state.12  This article takes the issue of the 
legitimacy of the institutions of international governance as its point of 
departure.13  However, legitimacy is here understood as ‘problematique’: that 
is, a form of problematization that emanates from a historically contingent 
set of conceptions and practices relating to international institutions, law, and 
democracy.14 
______________________________________________________________ 
9  Krajewski, “Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law” 
(2001) 35 J.W.T. 167. 
10  Jawara and Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International 
Trade Negotiations (2003)  
11  Brunnee and Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an 
Interactional Theory of International Law” (2000) 39 Colum. J.Transnat’l L. 19. 
12  Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade 
Organization (2001), p.4.  See also Howse, “From Politics to Technocracy - And 
Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime” (2002) 96 AJIL at 94. 
13  Coicaud and Heiskanen, The Legitimacy of International Organizations (2001); 
Delbruck, “Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational 
Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?” (2003) 10 Ind. J.Global 
Legal Studies 29. 
14  Tully, supra n.2, at 551, in attempting a definition of “political theory” defines a 
“subaltern school” of political theory that does not seek a normative solution but 
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The ‘Legitimacy Crisis’ and Legal Formalism 
The apparent intractability of the debates over the legitimacy of an 
international institution such as the WTO, my argument will suggest, is in 
large measure a reflection of the legal framework in which they are typically 
cast.  A legitimacy critique already identifies the problem as a matter of 
institutional design. By calling into question the architecture of the institution 
itself, as opposed to its failure to achieve any particular desired outcomes, 
the critique invokes formalist debates over what H.L.A. Hart has called 
‘secondary’ rules.15  In Hart’s hierarchical conception, secondary rules, the 
‘rules of the rules’ or the rules that determine which rules are indeed ‘law’, 
are a necessary part of a mature and functioning legal system.16  Indeed, 
Hart’s question, considered in the final chapter of The Concept of Law, “Is 
international law really law?”17 is one that continues to vex international 
lawyers.18  Despite the obvious difficulties in adapting a positivist view of 
law to the contemporary international legal arena, it continues to exert a 
significant ‘pull’.19  Legitimacy critics (and defenders) routinely invoke a 
relatively narrow range of familiar legal theoretical presumptions, based on a 
questionable analogy with domestic legal realms, about the proper 
foundations of legal authority, and by implication, the necessary forms of 
legitimate legality, in the international realm.  
The vast majority of participants in these debates, whether they might be 
broadly characterized as ‘defenders’ or ‘critics’ of the current institutional 
order, share certain foundational assumptions about the nature of the 
international community and the form of international law, even as they 
disagree over the specific legal and institutional arrangements that might best 
achieve the imagined ends.  This ‘shared sensibility’ has been described as 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
grounds itself in practical concerns. This type of political theory utilizes historical 
surveys in order to be able to see “practices and their forms of problematization as 
a limited and contingent whole”, at 534. “If we are to develop a political 
philosophy that has the capacity to bring to light the specific forms of oppression 
today, we require an Enlightenment critical ‘attitude’ rather than a doctrine, one 
that can test and reform dubious aspects of the dominant practices and form of 
problematization of politics against a better approach to what is going on in 
practice”, at 537. 
15  See, e.g. Trachtman, in adopting HLA Hart’s formalist hierarchy of primary and 
secondary rules to questions of constitutionalism at the WTO, proposes that a 
special type of secondary rule, a ‘tertiary rule,’ is necessary to determine the 
allocation of authority between constitutions in the international realm. 
Trachtman, “The WTO Constitution: Tertiary Rules to Untangle Intertwined 
Elephants” (2004) unpublished (on file with author), p.4.  
16  Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., 1961). 
17  ibid. at p.209.  “It is indeed arguable, as we shall show, that international law not 
only lacks secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for 
legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying ‘sources’ 
of law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules.  These 
differences are indeed striking and the question, ‘Is international law really law?’ 
can hardly be put aside.”  
18  Pahuja, “Power and the Rule of Law in the Global Context” (2004) 28(1) MURL 
232; see also, Kennedy, “When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box” 
(2000) 32(2) N.Y.U.J.Int’l Law & Pol. 335. 
19  Brunnee and Toope, supra n.12, at 22-24. 
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‘cosmopolitan’ or even ‘messianic’.20  It locates the antagonists of debates 
over international governance within a shared horizon of aspiration: a 
‘better’, more inclusive and democratic world order which functions as an 
ever-present, yet continually deferred backdrop, to the discourses of global 
governance.  As Anne Orford has described, in relation to the ‘linkage’ 
debate over trade and human rights, “proponents and opponents of the WTO 
both use an appeal to ‘democracy to come’ as the foundation of the 
arguments about the need to reform existing laws and institutions”.21  
My aim in this article is to consider in more detail what embedded 
assumptions about the necessary or possible forms of law are mobilized 
within these debates, and what role they might play in shaping the future of 
international governance.  It is my argument that how we imagine the ‘form’ 
of law makes a significant difference both to our conceptualization of 
problem and the available range of possible solutions. Much work in this 
field envisions pluralism as an important vehicle by which to improve the 
legitimacy, democracy and accountability of the WTO and other institutions 
of transnational governance.  Integrating non-governmental actors and 
‘disaggregating’ conceptions of sovereignty or the state are typical 
pluralizing gestures found within this literature.22  Yet, at the same time, 
these debates have tended to re-inscribe presumptions of about the positive 
and unified (monist) nature of law conveyed through their reliance on the 
language of coherence, linkages or constitutionalism.   
Pluralizing the WTO from Within: The Mystical Appeal of 
Constitutionalism  
Why is it that, in our heterogeneous and constantly changing global context, 
a ‘constitutional’ conception of law seems so compelling?  In most accounts, 
the quest for a ‘post-national’ constitutionalism is described as emerging in 
response to perceived ‘deficits’ of governance at the transnational level: of 
democracy, legitimacy, accountability.  It is also a response that seeks to 
draw from the deep well of signification that constitutional discourse carries 
in the west.  As Neil Walker observes, “the normatively continuous idea of 
constitutionalism is linked in a powerful and resilient chain of signification 
to a whole series of core governance values– democracy, accountability, 
equality, separation of powers, rule of law and fundamental rights”.23  
The appeal of constitutionalism as an explanatory framework for current and 
anticipated developments in the international trading regime is multifaceted. 
Firstly, constitutional theory conventionally provides an account of the 
political foundations of legitimate legal authority, which as we’ve seen, has 
been called into question in the WTO context.  Secondly, the ‘hands-tying’ 
______________________________________________________________ 
20  Buchanan, “Global Civil Society and Cosmopolitan Legality at the WTO: 
Perpetual Peace or Perpetual Process?” (2003) 16 LJIL 673: on the messianic, see 
Orford, “Trade, Human Rights and the Economy of Sacrifice” (2004) Jean 
Monnet Working Paper, and Koskenniemi “Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom 
Franck’s Messianic World” (2003) 35 N.Y.U.J.Int’l Law & Pol. 471 at 486. 
21  Orford, ibid., at 4.  
22  Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” (2002) 65(3) M.L.R 317; 
Slaughter, A New World Order (2004). 
23  Walker, supra n.22 at 344. 
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quality of constitutionalism appeals to advocates of a liberalized global 
trading order, such as Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, who sees its benefits 
threatened by the potential capture of the domestic political process in 
member-states by various special interests.24  Constitutional debates also 
hold out the promise of ‘recognition’ and ‘accommodation’ of diverse 
constituencies and normative claims within a single unifying framework.  
Hence, they resonate with those who are concerned with linkage issues, often 
identified as the range of ‘trade and . . .’ concerns: environment, human 
rights, labour, or sustainable development. Indeed, one might suggest that the 
turn to constitutional discourse at the WTO seems to offer all things to all 
people: it first grounds WTO law in political legitimacy, then sets it above 
the fray of politics, all the while promising a dispassionate arena for the fair 
resolution of fundamental normative disagreements.    
What binds these very disparate approaches and perspectives together is a set 
of ideas about ‘constitutionalism’ that are, in turn, dependent upon a 
particular view of law.  So it is that we find some commentators drawing our 
attention to points of convergence between WTO legal structures or practices 
and domestic legal forms, such as the juridification of the dispute resolution 
process by the introduction of the Appellate Body and the types of reasoning 
it has deployed.25  Others base their arguments on the points of divergence; 
maintaining that the WTO as currently constituted must fail the test of 
constitutional adequacy because of its deficits in the realm of democratic 
representation, ‘voice’ or citizenship.26 In both cases, however, the implicit 
standard is municipal or state constitutionalism. In this way, constitutional 
debates about the WTO have the effect of making our discussions of the 
global trading order look more like the formal and autonomous picture of 
‘state law’ that implicitly functions as the standard of legality against which 
all other forms of normative ordering are judged.27  They also have the effect 
of setting the WTO further apart from (and possibly above) other institutions 
(and mechanisms) through which transnational economic relations are 
governed, in line with the implicit assumption that ‘legal orders’ must be 
hierarchical. Debates about economic governance framed in constitutional 
terms resonate with a wide range of differently positioned actors in part 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
24 Petersmann, “Constitutional Primacy and ‘Indivisibility’ of Human Rights in 
International Law?  The Unfinished Human Rights Revolution and the Emerging 
Global Integration Law”, p.211, in Griller (ed.) International Economic 
Governance and Non-Economic Concerns: New Challenges for the International 
Legal Order (2002).  
25  Cass, “Constitutionalization of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm Generation 
as the Engine of Constitutional Development of International Trade” (2001) 12(1) 
EJIL 39.    
26  Krajewski, supra n.9; Howse and Nicolaidis, “Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: 
Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?”, p.73, in Verwej and Josling (eds.), 
“Deliberately Democratizing Multilateral Organizations”: (2003) 16(1) 
Governance.  
27  “Much of the effort in recent inter-state trade, environmental and human rights 
negotiation has been directed to reducing the distance between these transnational 
and national normative constructs by recasting the former in the image of the 
latter”: MacDonald, “Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal 
Pluralism” (1998) 15 Ariz.J.Int'l & Comp.L. 69 at 80. 
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because they tend to transpose familiar arguments from the domestic realm 
onto the terrain of international economic law.  
Further, constitutional discourses are frequently identified as a framework 
within which competing normative claims are balanced and accommodated. 
That is, constitutionalism is one vehicle within which the challenges 
presented by political pluralism for governance are to be managed, at both 
the national and transnational level.28  Within the WTO, constitutionalism is 
often presented as offering both a principled way to integrate the 
acknowledged variety of ‘trade and . . .’ concerns that have accompanied the 
expanding agendas of recent negotiating rounds and a foundation for 
engagement with non-state or civil society actors.  As has frequently been 
observed, fostering political pluralism requires the development of 
mechanisms of democratic accountability, as well as the capacity to facilitate 
political trade-offs between areas of jurisdictional authority.29  Each of these 
presumes a ‘totality’ in relation to which the balancing or accounting is done.  
In its current form, the WTO is usually recognized as lacking both the 
jurisdictional scope and autonomy and the law-making authority to facilitate 
such balancing.30  Advocates of WTO constitutionalism seek to redress this 
lack by expanding both the scope and the authority of the WTO, while 
scholars located within what I’ve described as the pluralist approach would 
prefer that these normative conflicts be resolved outside the institution.    
Most fundamentally, I would argue, the attraction of constitutionalism is the 
view that, in purporting to ground legal authority in a founding act of 
political will, constitutional approaches offer a type of ‘practical’ solution to 
the “thorny issues of the non-foundational foundations of law.”31 A 
constitution is essentially an originary narrative, in that it offers an account 
of the source of both legal and political authority.32  It does so by purporting 
to ground that authority in the political will of a ‘people’ understood to be 
capable of acting as a unified entity. The ‘people,’ however, cannot come 
into existence as such until after the founding inaugurated by the 
constitution.  The constitutional ‘moment’, then, is always a type of ‘pious 
fiction’.33  
Critical scholars have for some time scrutinized this paradox of law’s 
purported ‘founding’ in a constitutional moment – as Peter Fitzpatrick has 
perhaps put it most succinctly, that “the origin has to ‘be’ before and after the 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
28  Walker, supra n.22. 
29  Nanz and Steffek, “Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere” 
(2004) Governance and Opposition 314.  See also, Howse and Nicolaides, supra 
n.27 
30  “WTO law allows for the constraint of policies that interfere with the trading 
rights of members, but there no institutional arrangements provide for the creation 
of new, agreed-upon policies that can rebalance such trading rights with other 
legitimate policy objectives”; Howse and Nicolaidis, supra n.27 at 84  
31  Teubner, “Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered 
Constitutional Theory?”, p.3 et seq., in Joerges, Sand and Teubner (eds.) 
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (2004).  
32  Pahuja and Beard,(eds.), Divining the Source: Law’s Foundation and the Question 
of Authority (2004).    
33  Hart, supra n.17 at 153. 
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point of origination”.34 Debates over transnational constitutionalization that 
begin from the assumption that law’s autonomy and authority are definitively 
secured ‘within’ the state, and that this foundational authority needs to be 
somehow replicated in the transnational sphere, miss this point about law’s 
paradoxically divided origins.  The insight that law is not unified, even at its 
point of origination, instead leads us back towards the ethos of plurality to 
which I will shortly turn.    
Some scholars have identified ‘the process of mutual constitution and 
containment’ of law and politics as a necessary, indeed defining, feature of 
constitutionalism.35 As Gunther Teubner puts it, “The point is continually to 
understand the paradoxical process in which any creating of law always 
already presupposes the rudimentary elements of its own constitution, and, at 
the same time, constitutes these only through their implementation”.36   This 
paradoxical relation is what holds law and politics, necessarily, both together 
and apart, enabling and constraining each.37  But the pragmatic embrace of 
the paradoxical nature of law’s foundations, an insight already central to 
much contemporary legal theorizing, doesn’t yet answer the question that 
frames this section – what is the specific attraction of constitutionalism for 
these scholars? 
The normative thrust of this argument finds its source in the ‘reflexive’ 
nature of constitutional discourse itself.  Reframing public and scholarly 
debates in constitutional terms, for these scholars, contains the potential to 
transform the ongoing process of transnational juridification in such a way as 
to bring into being the conditions for legitimate constitutionalization that are 
currently lacking.  As Walker puts it, “…in the final analysis the ideological 
dimension of constitutional politics…is not the enemy of a normative 
discourse of responsible self government but rather its necessary 
accompaniment, and indeed, a central part of its generative context.”38  For 
Teubner, it is to ‘guarantee the chances of articulating so-called non-rational 
logics of action against the dominant social rationalization trend, by 
conquering areas of autonomy for social reflection in long-lasting conflicts, 
and institutionalizing them”.39 Both Walker and Teubner, albeit from within 
quite different theoretical models, appear to be basing their argument for 
constitutionalism on a belief in the salutary effects of constitutional discourse 
itself.  In the end, this approach rests on the hope that constitutionalism will 
“(open) up a richer and more productive normative debate”.40 Even 
constitutional sceptics such as Howse and Nicolaidis acknowledge that this 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
34  Fitzpatrick, “Breaking the unity of the world: Savage Sources and feminine law” 
(2003) 19 Aus Fem LJ 47 
35  Walker, supra n.19 at 340. 
36  Teubner, supra n.31 at 16. 
37  Teubner, supra n.31 at 20; in the language of systems theory, “long term structural 
linkages of sub-system specific structures and legal norms are set up . . . The 
important effect of structural linkage is that it restrains both—the legal process and 
the social process – in their possibilities of influence.”.   
38  Walker, “The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key”, p.58, in de 
Burca and Scott (eds.), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues” 
(2001). 
39  Teubner, supra n.31 at 13. 
40  ibid., at 54. 
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self-reflexive tendency of constitutional discourse may, over the longer term, 
contain some limited potential to contribute to a transformation of the 
currently inhospitable conditions for a pluralist politics at the WTO, even as 
they are highly critical of most efforts to ‘bootstrap’ the legitimacy of the 
WTO by relying on constitutional discourse itself as the vehicle to bring 
about the very conditions needed for its emergence.41   
Ultimately, this argument brings us back to the question  to what extent do 
even reflexive constitutional approaches pre-determine the parameters within 
which transnational legality must take shape?  Two tendencies are of concern 
here.  Firstly, there is the way in which a call for constitutionalism is 
responsive to the discourse of ‘deficits’ mentioned earlier.  That is, 
constitutional discourse is posited as a supplement, something that will 
supply ‘more’ of whatever is currently ‘lacking’ in transnational legality; 
democracy, accountability, legitimacy, or even, self-reflexive constitutional 
discourse itself.  Similarly, the call for constitutionalism implies both a 
hierarchy and a trajectory of transnational legalities, in which some emerging 
legal forms are imagined as more complete (constitution-like) than others.  
This trajectory, which might be said to parallel to the developmental 
hierarchy of states in the Westphalian order, has the effect of privileging 
certain legal forms, such as judicial norm-generation, over others.42 Further, 
constitutional debate tends to focus on highly formalized and juridified 
entities such as the EU and the WTO, while an entity such as the World 
Social Forum, devoted to broadening and democratizing the public debate 
over transnational norms, is virtually ignored.  In these ways, we can see that 
the potential of constitutional discourse to facilitate the pluralizing and/or 
democratizing of the practices of transnational governance is actually quite 
limited.  Paradoxically, despite the prominence given to the need for pluralist 
institutional reform within contemporary debates over the legitimacy of the 
WTO, closer consideration of this scholarship also reveals an enduring 
rigidity: the persistence of the modernist preference for coherence and order 
in the imagining of legal forms.43  
Pluralizing the WTO from Without:  Civil Society 
Engagements 
In recent years, there has been a dramatic expansion of transnational 
advocacy on the part of nongovernmental organizations focused on 
international institutions such as the WTO.44  These transnational advocacy 
efforts and the networks that they engender are frequently described as a 
‘global civil society’ whose emergence is then identified with a number of 
positive outcomes for global governance.45  Organized civil society is often 
identified as providing a “discursive interface between international 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
41  Howse and Nicolaidis, supra n.27 at 91. 
42  Cass, supra n.26. 
43  See Manderson, supra n.7, for a discussion of this modernist inclination towards 
coherence and order as an aesthetic preference. 
44  I have argued elsewhere that the picture of the nation-state in decline has been 
frequently overdrawn. Buchanan and Pahuja, “Law, Nation, and (Imagined) 
International Communities” (2004) 8 Law, Text, Culture 137.      
45  See generally the various editions of the OUP Global Civil Society Yearbook, 
inaugurated in 2001.  
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organizations and a global citizenry” capable of “monitor(ing) policy making 
in these institutions, …bring(ing) citizens concerns into their deliberations 
and empower(ing) marginalized groups so that they too may participate 
effectively in global politics”.46  The discourse of global civil society is 
sustained by a cosmopolitan sensibility, which underpins a vision of an 
imagined ‘global community’ that is simultaneously inclusive, plural and 
governable.47  
Not surprisingly, the on-the-ground struggles of transnational advocacy 
networks are far removed from the utopian aspirations frequently projected 
upon them.  All too frequently, the role of transnational NGO’s in global 
governance is functional, technocratic and apolitical.  The meetings and 
cooperative understandings of governance networks are usually private, 
informal, and lacking in mechanisms for accountability or transparency.  
Rather than facilitating political processes, transnational NGO’s have been 
criticized as effectively helping to bureaucratize and de-politicize the 
activities of governments across borders.48  Rather than an imagined ‘voice 
of the people’ idealized as distinct from the dictates of both governments and 
the market, transnational networks of NGO’s have emerged in tandem with 
the shift to different styles of governing both at domestic and international 
levels.  Moreover, the goals and interests of actors in governance networks 
cannot be imagined as ‘autonomous’ or ‘objective’, but are constructed 
through their myriad interactions embedded within these networks over 
time.49  In these ways, it is possible to argue that the space for politics in 
global governance networks has been diminished, even as the participation of 
NGO’s has expanded.50    
The constraints on the capacity of NGO networks to engender pluralism in 
the practices of international institutions can be illustrated by recent 
developments in WTO/civil society relations.51  Over the past six years, 
various coalitions of civil society organizations have pressed for greater 
access to both rule-making and dispute resolution processes within the 
institution.52  Many NGO’s and commentators would likely describe these 
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efforts as having only very limited success, however, resulting in a few 
largely cosmetic institutional reforms.53  That said, a focus on formal 
institutional resistance by the WTO to NGO demands for greater access and 
transparency may overlook some important but less visible shifts.  A number 
of transnational nongovernmental organizations, at least since the Doha 
Ministerial Round in 2001, have increasingly targeted their advocacy efforts 
‘behind the scenes’ on particular issues that will enable them to build 
relationships with delegates from various member-state governments.  
Several of these organizations have recently opened offices in Geneva to 
more effectively track the institution’s activities and lobby member-state 
representatives.54  Because they are in Geneva, building close relationships 
with delegates and members of the Secretariat, these groups are able to gain 
informal access, to disseminate to other NGO’s, and even member country 
governments, a great deal of information that is not officially public. Some 
organizations have built very comprehensive websites that serve as clearing 
houses for reports of various negotiation developments, and detailed 
accounts are usually posted within days of these ‘closed door’ sessions 
occurring.55  In general, a great deal of information about what is going on 
inside this allegedly closed and secretive institution is now widely available 
almost immediately, due to the work of a number of transnational legal 
advocacy and civil society groups.56   
So, while many NGO’s may profess frustration at the lack of progress on the 
institutional reform agenda, they would also acknowledge that the 
environment within which trade policy is both made and adjudicated by the 
WTO has changed significantly in the past decade. Significantly, 
transnational advocacy organizations have worked with developing country 
governments to bolster their capacities to participate effectively in trade 
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negotiations and in trade disputes.57  Some have even provided assistance in 
the preparation of legal arguments for trade disputes to small country 
governments.  Many seek to provide in depth information and research on 
issues of concern to particular member states, such as the campaign by 
Oxfam leading up to the Cancun Ministerial Round to publicize the impact 
of cotton subsidies on the West African nations of Burkina Faso, Benin, 
Chad, and Mali.58   Such efforts on the part of NGO’s in support of member 
country governments can raise the profile of issues, getting new topics on the 
agenda (as in the case of cotton subsidies) or even result in changes to 
negotiated text (as in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health).59 
During the 2003 Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, NGO’s convened at least a 
dozen parallel conferences and workshops on various trade policy issues, 
many of which attracted both ‘official’ members of delegations as well as 
academics and activists. Finally, in the realm of dispute resolution, the 
ongoing controversy over the consideration of amicus briefs has not 
prevented a number of organizations from continuing to prepare and file such 
briefs.60  Even though they may not be formally cited or ‘considered’ by the 
Appellate Body there are good reasons to believe that they are indeed read, 
and that over time the submission of persuasive and well argued briefs from 
third parties may well function to ‘broaden the perspectives’ of judges.61    
In the interstices of the relatively formalized procedures for dispute 
resolution, and in conference rooms and hotel lobbies in Geneva, Doha, 
Cancun and Hong Kong, ongoing debates over the appropriate scope and 
substance of trade policy are taking place.  To the extent that a number of 
civil society organizations have invested their resources in developing the 
capacity to speak the language of trade policy and in closely monitoring 
current developments in Geneva, they have indeed become participants in the 
collective process of norm-generation in and around the WTO.  Yet, even as 
trade governance has become pluralized in recent years, these developments 
don’t appear to be leading to the type of institutional transformation that 
many have suggested is so urgently needed.  This is because expanded 
participation in governance networks is a significant, but not the most 
significant, mechanism of pluralization.  There must also be the opportunity 
for a plurality of institutional and legal forms to develop and evolve.  While 
one form of plurality may lead to the other, it doesn’t necessarily follow that 
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a more diverse set of participants will produce more diverse institutional 
arrangements.             
One of the key claims made in this article is that the modest degree of 
success arguably achieved by recent NGO efforts to engage with the World 
Trade Organization and to influence both its institutional structure and its 
decision making processes fails to include a re-conception of legal forms and 
institutions, and for that reason, falls short of the degree of transformation 
that it seeks.  I have argued that debates over the reform of the institution, 
while they rarely consider law in an explicit or conceptual manner, are 
frequently infused with an implicit notion of law as an autonomous and 
distinct realm, precise and technical in nature as opposed to indeterminate 
and political.  This conception places a serious constraint on the scope of 
reforms aimed at pluralizing the institution and on the range of subjects who 
can be imagined as potential participants in World Trade Organization ‘law-
making’ practices.  To the extent that they deal with technical legal issues, 
only those groups from organized civil society that have developed the 
expertise to engage with these issues can participate.  This constraint is also 
manifested in a growing divide between those civil society groups that have 
chosen to pursue ‘inside’ versus ‘outside’ strategies in relation to the WTO.   
I have argued that, much like the constitutionalists, civil society engagements 
with the World Trade Organization have been oriented by the problematique 
of legitimacy.  Their efforts are similarly hamstrung by a persistent idea that 
formal (positive) law is the source and guarantor of legitimacy.  This is 
reflected, for example, in the focus on the need for formal legal reforms to 
improve the external transparency of the WTO, notwithstanding significant 
developments at the informal level.  More generally, to the extent that 
advocacy successes at the informal level are not reflected in formal 
institutional reforms and/or clearly defined legal norms, they are seen as 
somehow lacking, inadequate or underdeveloped.  It can also be seen in the 
way that they frame their call for pluralism in terms of participation, 
imagined as a separate matter from the actual legal frameworks that these 
subjects are engaging with.  In arguing that there is no great distance 
between the ‘pluralist’ approach of civil society and the constitutional 
approaches discussed earlier, I am suggesting that for each, a monist 
conception of law itself functions as both an anchor and a limit to the re-
conceptualization of global trade governance.  Both fail to recognize the 
existent plurality of diverse and competing legal forms in the international, 
and circumscribe further developments by locating them within the utopian 
and perennially incomplete project of cosmopolitan law.    
Global Trade Governance Unbound?  
I have suggested that the apparent conflict between two approaches or styles 
of thinking about law has defined the space within which the debates over 
the future of the World Trade Organization as an institution are taking place.  
The debates tend to oscillate between two positions that might be identified 
as ‘constitutionalist’ and ‘pluralist’.   This final section will attempt to step 
back from the current debates to examine the question of the frame itself.  Is 
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it possible to re-imagine transnational governance in a way that is not 
‘bounded’ by these two poles of constitutionalism and pluralism?62  
The apparent conflict between these two approaches obscures the fact that, as 
I’ve argued, they share a certain style or habit of thinking which foregrounds 
questions of ‘legitimacy’ and links them to a particular way of conceiving 
law.   These approaches also share, with the constitutional approach, a 
tendency to think of law in terms of coherence, order, and totality.  In this 
final section of the paper, I consider whether it is possible to open up a space 
for thinking about law in a different way.  It should be clear by now that I am 
not seeking to offer a pragmatic alternative to currently mooted proposals for 
institutional reform.  Instead, I am intentionally occupying a position that is 
both provisional and provocative.  My modest aim is to interrupt the 
established parameters of current debates over WTO governance in order to 
speculate about what implications a metaphoric shift in our capacity to 
imagine legal forms might have in this context.63  
Martti Koskeniemmi, a provocateur whose project has sympathies with my 
own, developed a dichotomy similar to the one I have outlined above, in a 
recent talk.64  Koskeniemmi identifies these two approaches, ‘constitutional’ 
and ‘legal pluralist’ as reflections of the modernist tendency to pit narratives 
of unity and fragmentation against one another.  In his account, unity or 
constitutionalism is considered as a hegemonic project, impelled by a 
totalizing logic of power, globalization, and empire; against which plurality 
is frequently posited as the counter-hegemonic vehicle of freedom and 
innovation.  Koskeniemmi chooses to describe these contrasting approaches 
to representing law in the transnational as ‘legal mindsets’ rather than as 
legal theories, both to highlight their location within these wider narrative 
streams and to reveal their subjectivity and fluidity.  According to him, both 
are responses to the problem of ‘fragmentation’ of international law and 
neither is entirely successful in meeting the challenge of mediating between 
the need for ‘centrality and control on the one hand, diversity and freedom 
on the other”.65   They cannot be successful, in part, because he argues that as 
‘generalizing doctrines’ the meaning of these approaches is not pre-
determined; it depends on context.  As he puts it, “their political significance 
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is ambivalent.  Each may be used to support as well as to challenge the 
existing state of affairs.”66  In Koskeniemmi’s account, as in mine, the 
differences between constitutional and pluralist approaches are minimized.  
What is of greater analytic significance for each of us is the connections 
among these mindsets, rather than their clashes. 
Where my argument differs from his is in what we make of this insight.  He 
argues by way of conclusion that the task for critical lawyers should be to 
reveal the multiple and shifting politics of these competing regimes, and to 
politicize the discourse of multiplicity itself. 
“This is why I am not worried about the multiplicity of 
regimes or the clash of legal rationales.  On the contrary, they 
are the platform for today’s politics.  The real concern is the 
homogeneity of the cultural and professional outlook of the 
participants, the pretense that the decision follow cognitive or 
technical grounds and are therefore immune to political 
contestation . . . I want to suggest that the discourse of 
multiplicity itself should be redescribed in political terms, as a 
competition between different systems and criteria for 
allocating resources between social groups.”67.   
While I agree that it is important to understand the impact of competing 
normative regimes for differently situated publics, I’m not sure that shifting 
the analysis from the legal to the political register necessarily makes things 
more transparent.  Representing international legality in this way seems to 
suggest that politics is something that is somehow ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the 
law, rather than already embedded within legal discourses and institutions.  
As Koskeniemmi well knows, while law and politics are interpenetrated, 
legal discourses cannot be equated in any straightforward way with political 
outcomes.  Moreover, while a critical investigation of the politics of law in 
particular contexts can be quite helpful in revealing law’s failures and 
exclusions, it has little to say about the productive or generative aspects of 
law, or about the capacities of legal subjects to contest or make new 
meanings out of the law.    
I believe a more generous reading of Koskeniemmi is available, however.  
Of course he can be read as calling for more attentiveness to the particular 
effects of different ways of talking about law – this is clear when he speaks 
of the limitations of a technocratic, realist approach that draws heavily on 
certain branches of International Relations theory and sees little of value in 
the more aspirational discourses of public international law.  But, he also 
reminds us of Kant’s dictum that rules don’t determine their own application.  
Rather, they must be interpreted and applied by legal subjects, operating 
within particular discursive and institutional contexts.  Indeed, one of his 
signature contributions has been to draw greater attention to the work of 
these subjects in the making of international law.68  So it would seem that his 
conception of law must also include an important role for the law creating 
function of legal subjects.   
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This reading would bring Koskeniemmi much closer to my own provocation: 
which rests in the attempt to imagine law as itself inherently plural, a quality 
that I posit as emerging from an appreciation of the manifold potential of a 
world of law-creating subjects.  While an understanding of subjectivity as 
law-making also underpins Koskeniemmi’s account, he is more concerned 
with the relatively homogeneous professional category of international 
lawyers, whom he fears are lacking both creativity and political commitment.  
I am more interested in exploring what new pathways for thinking are 
opened up when we think of a much wider range of subjects as potentially 
law-creating in this way.69       
My effort to re-imagine the ‘bounded’ discourses of global trade governance 
in this way has been inspired by the ‘radical’ or ‘critical’ legal pluralism of 
Rod McDonald, who has suggested that we need to think of law in terms of a 
‘metaphor of multiplicity’.70  MacDonald’s legal pluralism is quite distinct 
from the varieties of pluralism found in contemporary international legal 
discourse discussed above and from mainstream theories of law.  It departs 
from the view that law is necessarily formal and can be exclusively identified 
with state action.   Neither does it rely on a dichotomous construction of law 
and politics (or society).71  Where this account of law differs most 
significantly from the conceptions that I have argued are embedded within 
the discourses of trade governance, including those identified with ‘global 
legal pluralism’, is in its resistance to the cosmopolitan urge to accommodate 
difference within some overarching totality.    
Without the need for recourse to a unifying image of the constitutional 
moment, a radically legal pluralist imaginary could embrace multiplicity, 
heterarchy, and diversity.  It might allow for the possibility of thinking about 
transnational legality without a ‘centre’, or normative hierarchy.  That is, the 
relationship between emergent transnational regulatory regimes need not be 
reduced to a necessary relation of superior/inferior as judged by the extent to 
which they are more or less ‘legal’ or ‘constitutional’.  Rather, they could be 
understood in a variety of ways: overlapping, discrete, competing, 
interpenetrated, mutually constitutive.  In this way, the public discussion 
about the emergence and evolution of transnational legal norms might both 
be opened up to include a much wider range of formal and informal, 
institutional and discursive mechanisms, and to consider them on their own 
terms, rather than in relation to where they sit on a spectrum of ‘legitimacy’ 
in which ‘formal’ law still occupies the highest rung;  
“A radical legal pluralism seeks neither a separation, nor an 
eventual reconciliation, of multiple legal orders.  Normative 
heterogeneity exists both between various normative regimes 
which inhabit the same intellectual space, and within the 
regimes themselves.  The flux of power within and between 
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these regimes is determinative of their reconstruction within 
any given time-space.  The condition of living through the 
construction of normative regimes frustrates any attempt to 
unify or order them.  That is, a radical legal pluralism must be 
polycentrist”72  
Debates within the frame of what I am calling legal plurality can be 
contrasted with dominant approaches in the ways they might envision the 
participation of global civil society.  An illustrative example of the latter is 
found in the framework provided by de Burca and Walker, in their role as 
editors of a collection of essays on the topic of “Law, Civil Society and 
Transnational Economic Governance.”73  In their introduction, although they 
acknowledge the multiple discourses of civil society in careful detail, law is 
represented as a ‘central steering mechanism’: “One general and overarching 
question concerns the possibilities and limits of the role of law, in its 
institutional and discursive specificity, within the post national setting…does 
law, as a central steering mechanism, inevitably organize civil society in 
such a way as to reduce its autonomy?”74  The way the question is posed 
here, I would argue, prefigures its answer. If law is conceived as both 
centralized and autonomous, that is, an institutionalized realm of 
‘coordination’ that is separate from politics, it is hard to imagine it as capable 
of facilitating a multiple and diverse politics of global civil society.  This is 
because in mainstream approaches, the legal/political subject (here, civil 
society) can only be constituted, or ‘called forth,’ by being ‘called into 
line.’75    
Far from being ‘autonomous’ actors that might be envisioned to redress 
current ‘imbalances’ in global governance, I have argued that organized civil 
society networks have emerged and taken shape in response to developments 
in transnational governance.  The discourse, methods, and objectives of both 
civil society and governance networks must be understood as inter-
subjectively constituted.  What is important to stress, however, is that this 
insight has particular consequences for how one imagines the ‘form’ of law.  
Law can no longer be imagined independently from these ongoing processes 
of inter-subjective norm generation, but is itself generated by them.   
I have suggested that concerns with the legitimacy of transnational 
governance turns our attention towards questions of legal form, rather than 
substance, so that its outcomes are necessarily framed in terms of processes 
or procedures rather than rules.  Through the lens of legal pluralism, in 
contrast, the construction and contestation of normative frameworks by legal 
subjects becomes the focus of the inquiry.  For example, while much work 
has been done to more fully integrate the reconsideration of questions of 
recognition and participation into constitutional approaches to the WTO, the 
risk of dealing with these issues in constitutional terms is that they will 
become just another institutional design problem; another procedural detail 
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to be worked out by the institutional engineers of the global legal order.  In 
my view, the answers to such questions cannot be pre-determined. 
Institutional frameworks, the meaning of participation and the sources of 
legitimacy can and likely will be a multiple, contestable, and evolving as the 
subjects that are to be governed.   
Imagining law as polycentrist, intersubjectively constituted and non-
prescriptivist also facilitates a reflexive approach to the relationship between 
law and politics in the international realm.  Law is not a separate and distinct 
realm of normative ordering.   As Koskeniemmi reminds us, law provides a 
fluid and evolving space and discourse within which competing normative 
claims are debated, engaged, negotiated and compromised.  Yet, law and 
politics should not be imagined as discrete realms of activity, whether it is 
law or politics that is placed in the driver’s seat.  Rather, they need to be 
understood as intimately tied together in a mutual relation of ‘constituent 
complicity’.  It then follows that instead of being fixed and determinate, the 
form of law itself must also always be subject to re-conceptualization and 
transformation.  Allowing ourselves to re-conceive of transnational legal 
institutions and the politics surrounding them in this way, I argue, could 
further the dual aims of fostering political pluralism and increasing the 
legitimacy of an institution such as the WTO.  
For example, from within this perspective, we can consider how new 
instantiations of transnational political practice, such as those exemplified by 
various transnational movements for global social justice over the past 
decade, might influence the form of transnational legal regimes, as well as 
the converse.  Global civil society exists and operates from within relatively 
more ‘disorganized’ and ‘organized’ manifestations, yet a focus on its 
relation to more ‘constitution-like’ legal forms such as the World Trade 
Organization will tend to highlight the activities of the relatively more 
organized nongovernmental organizations, and those activities in particular 
that are specifically directed towards the ‘constitution’ of that institution.  
Law need not only be imagined as the necessary ‘institutional’ container of 
an unruly and disruptive ‘politics’ that is ‘prior’ to law but must be 
authorized by it.  The form of law itself might also be understood in its more 
‘disorganized’ form, as potentially plural, disruptive, subject to re-
conceptualization and transformation.   
There is indeed a crisis of legitimacy in global trade governance.  The need 
to democratize and pluralize transnational economic institutions such as the 
WTO is pressing.  The most significant barriers to reform, however, are not 
in fact the formal, institutional obstacles that attract the bulk of attention.  
Rather, they are the conceptual foundations of the debate itself, including 
most importantly assumptions about the autonomous and ‘monist’ nature of 
law, and the institutionalized relationship between the realms of law and 
politics. Re-envisioning the form of law as itself plural and contested invites 
us to transcend the limitations of the constitutional (and constitutive) form in 
which we currently find ourselves compelled to imagine the relationship 
between law and politics in the realm of trade governance. In this 
conception, the parameters of law are determined by the potential of a 
diverse array of lawmaking subjects; its only limitations the limits of our 
ability to imagine alternative legal worlds.  Unbounding our conception of 
transnational governance in this way frees us to engage with a much broader 
set of subjects and concerns than we might otherwise, and could provide a 
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more productive avenue through which to approach the pressing issues of 
inclusion, legitimacy and accountability.   
